

VZCZCXRO0325
RR RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #3424/01 3311231
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 261231Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0899
INFO RUCNOSC/OSCE POST COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003424

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2018

TAGS: [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [OSCE](#) [RS](#)

SUBJECT: MFA PREVIEWS RUSSIAN GOALS FOR OSCE MINISTERIAL

REF: STATE 106943

Classified By: POL MC Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary

¶1. (C) At the December 4 OSCE ministerial in Helsinki, Russia will formally launch Medvedev's proposed European Security Treaty (EST), push its reform agenda, and seek "balance" in any Ministerial Declaration. The MFA tells us that they see the OSCE as a dated body that does not take into account "more dynamic groups" and will continue to push reform in OSCE and ODIHR at both the Summit and in Vienna. Russia does not see a consensus for a Ministerial Statement, and does not hold out much hope in agreeing to language on Georgia. However, the Russian delegation will insist on incorporating the agreement of Presidents Sarkozy and Medvedev for an OSCE summit or meeting in 2009 to discuss the EST. When taken together, Russia's long-standing calls for reform and its proposed EST, calls into question Russia's continued support of the institution of the OSCE. End summary.

EST Proposal

¶2. (C) Lavrov, reportedly joined by French FM Kouchner, will use the lunch on December 4 as the first opportunity for a senior, multilateral discussion of the EST. Vladimir Yanin, Senior Counselor at the MFA covering OSCE issues, could provide us no details on Lavrov's presentation, but told us that Lavrov was drafting his own remarks and they would be a detailed elaboration of the concept. Yanin also told us that the MFA was planning on a summit or meeting in June or July to discuss the proposal, and participation would at least be based on the membership of the OSCE, plus representatives of related international and multilateral organizations, if not an OSCE hosted event.

Reform

¶3. (C) While Russia's EST proposal takes aim at what Russia perceives as the OSCE's failures to address "hard security" or "military-political" issues, Russia's long-standing calls for OSCE reform hits at Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), in particular, and the broader concept of security. DFM Grushko in an interview stated that "microscopic measures are clearly insufficient to remedy the systemic weaknesses that exist in this institution (ODIHR)." He further charged that the office "has turned into a mechanism of intervention in the internal affairs of states located east of Vienna." According to Yanin, Russia will continue to press for reform of the OSCE and ODIHR in four areas: adoption of a charter, agreement on basic principles for election monitoring, standardization of field missions,

and the role and accreditation process of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) at OSCE sessions. "The OSCE is an old-timer, created at a different time that does not take into account the formation of the EU or more dynamic groups," he said. Both Yanin, to us, and Grushko, publicly, criticized the OSCE for attempting to take on new issues without a clear mandate. Yanin observed that "the OSCE is trying to find niche issues, competing with competent organizations, for example on climate change," and that the Council of Europe was a more "lawful" and better equipped institution to address human rights concerns in Europe.

Ministerial Statements

14. (C) Yanin outlined a defensive position for Russia in regards to any OSCE statements, telling us that the Russian delegation would not support any document that went counter to Russian views of the situation in Georgia or Kosovo or did not achieve a "balance between hard and soft security issues." While recognizing that it was a point of pride to adopt a political declaration in Helsinki, he called it a "test of will," as there was no consensus on the need for a statement. He noted that it was likely that Russia could work to join a consensus on text regarding regional conflicts in Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh, but "there remained too many differences to find common ground" regarding Georgia. Russia will push hard for any statement to include the sentiment and comments of Presidents Medvedev and Sarkozy following the recent EU-Russia Summit in Nice, where Sarkozy endorsed the EST concept and called for a summit. Should a declaration not be possible, Russia's delegation may seek a

MOSCOW 00003424 002 OF 002

separate statement announcing the approval of the OSCE for the EST initiative.

Comment

15. (C) The language used to support President Medvedev's recent proposal for an EST and long-standing Russian proposals for reform of both the OSCE and ODIHR calls into question Russia's continued support for the OSCE as an institution and the common goals and values of the member states.
BEYRL